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Workers' Compensation-Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Irings Yarn:
Leaving Precedent in the Dust?
Considered one of the five most dangerous occupational substances,1 cot-
ton dust already has contributed to the disability of up to 11,000 textile work-
ers in North Carolina.2 Because most of these workers' disabilities cannot be
completely attributed to their occupational exposure,3 the issue of apportion-
ment of workers' compensation awards according to occupational and nonoc-
cupational causes is of great significance to workers, employers, and policy
makers.
4
The recent North Carolina Supreme Court case of Rutledge v. Tultex
Corp./Kings Yarn5 allows a plaintiff to be compensated fully even when his
disease is caused in part by nonoccupational factors.6 In a 4-3 decision, the
court determined that apportionment of benefits is unnecessary when a
worker's disability is caused completely by chronic obstructive lung disease to
which occupational exposure has contributed significantly.7 Crucial to the
court's decision was its declaration that Rutledge's occupational disease was
"chronic obstructive lung disease"8 rather than the traditionally recognized
occupational disease "byssinosis." 9 By characterizing chronic obstructive lung
disease as an occupational disease, the court was able to avoid, and severely
1. C. FRANKEL, 5A LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, § 33.59a, at 24 (rev. ed. Supp. 1980)
(800,000 workers nationwide risk byssinosis).
2. Ellis, The Brown Lung Battle, 4 N.C. INSIGHT 16, 16 (1981). But see Davis, Chronic Ob-
structive Lung and Cardiovascular Diseases, in N.C. BAR Assoc. FOUNDATION, WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION VII-67 (1979) (strict scientific justification supports estimate of only 500).
3. See IB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.64(b), at 7-432 (1982)
(byssinosis seldom occurs without history of smoking). See also Ellis, supra note 2, at 19 (state-
ment of William Stephenson, Chairman, N.C. Indus. Comm'n) ("In more than 90% of the [cotton
dust] cases that come before us, the claimants have some malady other than byssinosis.").
4. See generally Note, Apportionment of Disabilities is Limited Under the North Carolina Act,
54 N.C.L. REV. 1123 (1976).
5. 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
6. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 370.
7. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
8. The broad term "chronic obstructive lung disease" describes a condition caused by one or
more specific lung diseases (bronchitis, byssinosis, emphysema, etc.) which in their chronic stages
are generally medically indistinguishable. See id at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 366; A. BouHUYs, J.
SCHOENBERG, G. BECK & R. SCHILLING, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill
Community, 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 607 (Service Vol.
1978).
9. "Byssinosis," commonly known as brown lung disease, is a bronchial irritation often
found in workers exposed to cotton dust. While the disease frequently possesses unique character-
istics in its acute stages, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Administrative
Law, 59 N.C.L. REV. 1017, 1036 n.161 (1981) (describing the "classical history" of brown lung
development), byssinosis in its chronic stages generally is considered to be medically indistin-
guishable from other specific chronic obstructive lung diseases. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94-95, 301
S.E.2d at 366.
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limit the precedential value of, Morrison v. Burlington Industries,10 which had
required apportionment when the narrower occupational disease of byssinosis
was found to be partially responsible for a plaintiff's disability."l
The Rutledge court's apparent departure from precedent sparked consid-
erable controversy that began with the filing of a lengthy dissenting opinion
and culminated in a legislative proposal designed to negate the Rutledge hold-
ing.' 2 Although the effort to overrule Rutledge legislatively failed, the Rut-
ledge rule has not settled the issue of apportionment in lung disease cases.
Instead, by not expressly overruling the Morrison case and its progeny, i3 the
Rutledge opinion has further complicated the already confusing workers' com-
pensation law governing "dual causation."' 4 This note examines the success
and significance of the Rutledge court's attempts to reconcile its result with the
Morrison apportionment rule.
Plaintiff Margaret Rutledge worked for twenty-three years in various cot-
ton mills prior to her employment with defendant Kings Yarn in 1976.15 Her
pulmonary impairment began in 1969 with a cough at work and progressed
until 1979 when it disabled her from all but "sedentary work. . . in a clean
environment."' 6 Rutledge had been exposed to respirable cotton dust in all of
the mills, but her exposure was less severe in defendant's newer, cleaner mill
than in the others.' 7 She also smoked approximately one pack of cigarettes
per day throughout her period of employment in the cotton industry.' 8
The Industrial Commission's pulmonary specialist diagnosed Rutledge as
having "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, with [elements] of pulmonary
emphysema and chronic bronchitis."' 19 He opined that plaintiffs exposure to
cotton dust "probably was a cause" of her lung disease,20 although cigarette
smoking was "one of the more probable causes." 21 He also stated that her
lung problems were "caused by circumstances which existed prior to her em-
10. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
11. Id. at 13, 282 S.E.2d at 467.
12. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
13. Walston v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982), amendedon reh ', 305
N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
For a detailed discussion of Morrison as well as these cases, see Note, You Take (4.5% 0) my
Breath 4way-Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, (45% o)9 my Breath!; Note, Apportionment ofDisabiliy Compensation-Morrison v.
Burlington Industries, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 801 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Apportionment].
14. "Dual causation" refers to the causation problem when a personal element such as smok-
ing combines with an employment element to produce lung disease. A. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 41.64(a), at 7-424.
15. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361-62.
16. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 361.
19. Id. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
20. Id. at 90-91, 301 S.E.2d at 363. The expert also stated that Rutledge did "not give a
classical history of byssinosis," id. at 123, 301 S.E.2d at 382 (Meyer, J., dissenting), although he
admitted that textile workers are at an increased risk of developing chronic lung disease "irrespec-
tive" of whether they show such a history, id. at 112, 301 S.E.2d at 376 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id at 92, 301 S.E.2d at 364.
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ployment [by Kings Yarn],' 22 although plaintiff's Kings Yam exposure could
have had "some [minimally] aggravating effect on [her] underlying condi-
tion."23 The Deputy Industrial Commissioner determined that because Rut-
ledge's exposure at Kings Yarn had "neither caused nor significantly
contributed" to plaintiffs disease,24 she had "not contracted chronic obstruc-
tive lung disease as a result of any exposure while working with defendant
employer." 25 The full Industrial Commission subsequently adopted the dep-
uty's findings and conclusion as its OWn.
26
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the Commission had
erred in requiring Rutledge to prove that her last employment had caused an
occupational disease rather than simply allowing her to prove it to have been
the last job to injuriously expose her to cotton dust.27 The court found the
error harmless, however, because the court agreed with the Commission's con-
clusion that the plaintiff had not contracted an occupational disease.
28
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
the Commission had erred in requiring Rutledge to prove that exposure at her
last employment had done anything more than "proximately [augment] her
disease to any extent, however slight."'29 A majority of the supreme court dis-
agreed that the error was harmless, however, because they believed that suffi-
cient evidence existed to support a finding that Rutledge's chronic obstructive
lung disease was a compensable occupational disease.30 Over a lengthy and
vigorous dissent, the majority held that a worker could be compensated to the
full extent of disability caused by chronic obstructive lung disease3' if her cot-
ton dust exposure significantly contributed to that disease.
32
Although North Carolina recognized compensable occupational diseases
as early as 1935,33 byssinosis has never appeared on the statutory list of prima
facie occupational diseases.34 Cotton dust claimants therefore found it neces-
22. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 56 N.C. App. 345, 347, 289 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
23. Id. at 347, 289 S.E.2d at 73.
24. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 88, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rutledge, 56 N.C. App. at 350, 289 S.E.2d at 74.
28. Id. It does not appear that the Commission reached such a conclusion. The Commission
merely had ruled that Rutledge had not contracted an occupational disease as a result of her
exposure at defendant's plant. See New Supreme Court Brief for Appellant at 15, Rutledge, 308
N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
29. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362.
30. Id. at 90, 301 S.E.2d at 363. Chronic obstructive lung disease was found to meet the
requirements of North Carolina's catch-all occupational disease provision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
53(13) (1979). See infra text accompanying note 35.
31. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
32. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
33. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130. For a discussion of the
gradual development of workers' compensation law in this area, see Note, Development of North
Carolina Occupational Disease Coverage, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341 (1971).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979). Prima facie occupational diseases in North Caro-
lina include asbestosis, id § 97-53 (24), and silicosis, id § 97-53 (25), as well as diseases such as
carbon monoxide poisoning, id § 97-53 (22), which are not purely occupational in nature.
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sary to rely on North Carolina's catch-all provision, which currently deems
occupational "any disease ...proven to be due to causes and conditions
which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, or
employment but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is equally exposed." 35 In 1979, after the catch-all provision had been
amended three times36 and clarified in Booker v. Duke Medical Center,37 the
North Carolina Supreme Court finally recognized byssinosis as an occupa-
tional disease.
38
The Booker court determined that the occupational exposure need not be
the sole originating cause of a worker's disease for that disease to be compen-
sable.39 But the issue of how much compensation would be allowed when a
worker's diseases were caused by both occupational and nonoccupational fac-
tors was not squarely addressed by the supreme court until Morrison v. Bur-
lington Industries.40 Despite finding that plaintiff was permanently and totally
disabled, the court in Morrison awarded compensation for only permanent
partial disability because only part of plaintiff's disability had been caused by
occupational factors.41 The court ruled that the Industrial Commission was
correct in apportioning Morrison's recovery according to the percentage of her
disability caused, aggravated, or accelerated solely by occupational factors.
42
The Morrison court failed to identify clearly the occupational disease
before it. Although plaintiff's claim sought compensation for "an occupa-
tional disease-to wit, byssinosis," 43 the Commission and the court followed
the lead of the medical experts, consistently referring to her incapacity to work
as being caused by "chronic obstructive lung disease due in part to cotton dust
exposure." 44 It is uncertain whether the court intended this phrase to mean
byssinosis, an occupational disease which was to be fully compensated because
it constituted that portion of plaintiff's chronic obstructive lung disease caused
by her occupational exposure, or whether the court recognized chronic ob-
structive lung disease as a separate occupational disease, which would be com-
35. Id. § 97-53(13).
36. See Note, Redfnition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable Compensation Statute-
Booker v. Duke Medical Center and Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 288,
289 (1980).
37. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
38. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979) (error for lower court to
take judicial notice that byssinosis was not a compensable occupational disease).
39. Booker, 297 N.C. at 473, 256 S.E.2d at 199.
40. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981). A student commentator stated that the issue of appor-
tionment was "[plerhaps the most significant issue presented to the [North Carolina] courts in
1981." Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-dministrative Law, 60 N.C.L. REv.
1164, 1194-95 (1982).
41. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 6-7, 282 S.E.2d at 463.
42. Id. at 13, 282 S.E.2d at 467. Apportionment was permitted even though a similar rule
had been rejected for accident claims. See Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C.
527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978). While admitting to forming a dichotomy, the Morrison court felt that
extending accident law to diseases was a legislative function. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 19,282 S.E.2d
at 470. This conclusion was criticized in Note, (4595 o) my Breath, supra note 13, at 123.
43. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 2, 282 S.E.2d at 461.
44. E.g., id at 8, 282 S.E.2d at 464.
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pensated only partially according to the disease's work related components. 45
This ambiguity surrounding the phrase "chronic obstructive lung disease"
later would provide the loophole through which the Rutledge majority would
reconcile its opinion with Morrison.
In a lengthy dissent to the Morrison opinion, Justice Exum stated that
neither precedent nor the facts supported the majority's position. In Exum's
view, no apportionment was necessary because Morrison's chronic obstructive
lung disease-an occupational disease in its own right-was completely re-
sponsible for her disability,47 and because her cotton dust exposure had "sig-
nificantly contributed" to that ultimate disease.
48
In Hansel v. Sherman Textiles,49 decided the same day as Morrison, the
supreme court recognized byssinosis as an occupational disease,50 but refused
to allow recovery of full benefits because part of plaintiffs disability was at-
tributable to asthma and chronic bronchitis, which were not occupational in
origin.5t The majority, relying heavily on Morrison, remanded the case to the
Industrial Commission for determination of the relative contributions of occu-
pational and nonoccupational factors to Hansel's disability.52 In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Exum reiterated his "significant contribution to
the ultimate disease" standard53 and noted the problems inherent in the In-
dustrial Commission's attempt to scientifically assign percentages to causes of
lung disease that are medically indistinguishable when in the chronic stages.5
4
The commentators' reactions to the majority opinions in Morrison and
Hansel were almost unanimously negative.55 Despite the critics' opposition to
the apportionment rule and the lower court's difficulty in applying it,56 the
rule continued to be binding. The most recent pre-Rutledge opinion of the
45. The "components" of chronic obstructive lung disease include pulmonary emphysema,
chronic bronchitis, and possibly asthma, as well as byssinosis. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 92, 301
S.E.2d at 364.
46. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 24-34, 282 S.E.2d at 473-79 (Exum, J., dissenting). For a pre-
Morrison review of North Carolina law supporting Exum's conclusions, see Note, supra note 4.
47. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470-71 (Exum, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 44, 282 S.E.2d at 484 (Exum, J., dissenting). The significant contribution test had
been previously suggested in Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 916, 932 (1980).
49. 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).
50. Id. at 48, 283 S.E.2d at 103.
51. Id. at 53, 283 S.E.2d at 106.
52. Id. at 58-59, 283 S.E.2d at 109.
53. Id. at 64, 283 S.E.2d at 112 (Exum, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 66, 283 S.E.2d at 113 n.8 (Exum, J., concurring).
55. See, e.g., A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-436 n.87 (Supp. 1983) ("remarkable"
that Morrison court apportioned without an express apportionment statute); Note, (45% oj] my
Breath, supra note 13, at 125 (Morrison departs from precedent, creates an artificial distinction
between accident and disease claims, and usurps legislature's function). For a somewhat more
favorable critique, see Note, Apportionment, supra note 13, at 820 (Morrison rule consistent with
purposes of Workers' Compensation Act, although a departure from precedent).
56. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Waverly Mills, 56 N.C. App. 14, 286 S.E.2d 837 (1982) (Morrison does
not require remand for apportionment when expert unable to assign percentages to relative contri-
butions); Anderson v. Smyre Mfg. Co., 54 N.C. App. 337, 283 S.E.2d 433 (1981) (no apportion-
ment required despite clear history of smoking). See also Note, Apportionment, supra note 13, at
809 (courts often simply defer to the Commission's evaluation of testimony).
19841
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North Carolina Supreme Court on the cotton dust issue was Walston v. Bur-
lington Industries.57 The pulmonary expert in Walston diagnosed the plaintiff
as having "possible" byssinosis that "could possibly" have played a role in
causation but which was more likely to have played a contributory role. 58 The
court affirmed the Industrial Commission's finding that Walston did not have
an occupational disease.
5 9
Finally writing for the majority, Justice Exum in Rutledge avoided the
apportionment rule by distinguishing Morrison and Hansel, despite Rutledge's
own argument in her court of appeals brief to the effect that Rutledge and
Morrison had "very similar facts."'60 Stating that the commission and court in
Morrison and Hansel had found the claimants' occupational diseases to be
byssinosis rather than chronic obstructive lung disease,61 Exum characterized
Rutledge as a case of first impression: "[the] question now clearly before us
for the first time is whether a textile worker's chronic obstructive lung disease
may be an occupational disease .... *62 The Rutledge majority answered this
question affirmatively, holding that a disease may be occupational if the
worker's exposure has contributed significantly to it.6 3 The court then re-
manded the case to the Industrial Commission to determine whether Rut-
ledge's years of textile labor had contributed significantly to her chronic
obstructive lung disease, and instructed the Commission that apportionment
would be unnecessary if the significant contribution standard were satisfied. 64
The court distinguished Walston on the ground that Rutledge's cotton dust
exposure was a "probable," rather than "possible," cause of her disease.65
Justice Meyer, joined by two others in dissent,66 persuasively argued that
the majority's attempts to avoid Morrison, Hansel, and Walston "subtly but
effectively" overruled them.67 The dissenters believed that chronic obstructive
lung disease was "not a specific disease in and of itself' '68 and should not have
been classified as an occupational disease. They argued that if the Rulledge
court had examined the plaintiffs specific lung diseases-as previous courts
57. 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1981), amended on reh'g, 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822
(1982).
58. Id. at 672, 285 S.E.2d at 824.
59. Justices Exum and Carlton concurred separately without opinion, apparently satisfied
that Exum's significant contribution threshold had not been crossed.
60. Plaintifi's Court of Appeals Brief at 7, Rutledge, 56 N.C. App. 345, 289 S.E.2d 72 (1982).
At the time of plaintifi's statement the North Carolina Supreme Court had not yet reversed the
court of appeals decision in Morrison, which supported Rutledge's claim.
61. Rudedge, 308 N.C. at 100, 301 S.E.2d at 369. Justice Exum previously had reached the
opposite conclusion about the Morrison majority's holding. In Hansel Exum stated in his concur-
ring opinion that "although Morrison claimed benefits for. . . byssinosis . ., this Court identi-
fied her occupational disease as chronic obstructive lung disease." Hansel, 304 N.C. at 61, 283
S.E.2d at 110 (Exum, J., concurring).
62. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 100-01, 301 S.E.2d at 369.
63. Id. at 101-02, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
64. Id. at 107, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
65. Id. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
66. Meyer was joined by Chief Justice Branch and Justice Copeland. All three had been in
the Morrison, Hansel, and Walston majorities.
67. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 109, 301 S.E.2d at 374 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 121, 301 S.E.2d at 381 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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had done-the majority would have found that occupational exposure had
contributed to some of Rutledge's diseases (e.g., byssinosis) and not to others
(e.g., emphysema). 69 By lumping all of Rutledge's specific lung diseases under
one generic term (chronic obstructive lung disease) and permitting the generic
term to qualify as an occupational disease, the majority necessarily reached
the conclusion that plaintiffs occupational exposure had contributed to her
disabling disease-if it had contributed to a component, it had contributed to
the whole. The dissenters called this analysis a "word trick,"70 arguing that
Rutledge was not distinguished from its predecessors by a difference in facts
but rather by what the majority had chosen to label the occupational disease.
Although Rutledge's departure from the precedent established by Morri-
son and Hansel can be explained by the change in the membership of the
North Carolina Supreme Court,71 that explanation adds little to an under-
standing of the law. By distinguishing Morrison and Hansel without overrul-
ing them, the Rutledge majority intimated that apportionment may still be
appropriate in some cases. The critical question remaining after Rutledge is:
under what circumstances is apportionment still required? Rutledge "in effect
overruled Morrison's apportionment rule in any case in which it is found that
the [plaintiffs] disability was entirely caused by chronic obstructive lung dis-
ease."72 It may be argued, however, that apportionment still is required if the
worker's disability is not caused entirely by chronic obstructive lung disease,
or if his occupational disease is identified as byssinosis rather than chronic
obstructive lung disease.
The Rutledge majority conceded in dicta that apportionment would be
permissible if nonoccupational, nonpulmonary ailments "contributed inde-
pendently" to a plaintiff's incapacity to work.73 The court did not provide any
examples of such "independent contributing factors," or explain how the In-
dustrial Commission might recognize them. Some clues to the meaning of the
term may be gleaned, however, from the Morrison court's majority and dis-
senting opinions. In Morrison plaintiffs lung difficulties prompted her em-
ployer to transfer her to a dust-free environment where she was required to
stand while working. Because of her preexisting phlebitis, Morrison was un-
able to work standing up, and thus was totally disabled from working in any
part of the textile plant.74 The Morrison majority identified phlebitis, varicose
veins, and diabetes as independent contributing factors, requiring apportion-
69. Id. at 125, 301 S.E.2d at 383 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Emphysema was noted specifically
as being scientifically incapable of occupational causation, aggravation, or acceleration.
70. Id. They also disagreed with the majority's characterization of Walston as a "possible
cause" case and Rutledge as a "probable cause" case, calling it a "distinction without a differ-
ence." Id. at 128, 301 S.E.2d at 385 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
71. Justices Huskins and Britt, both of whom had been in the 5-2 majorities of Morrison,
Hansel, and Walston, were replaced by Justices Mitchell and Martin in 1982. Justice Carlton,
who had joined in the previous Exum opinions, was replaced by Justice Frye in 1983. All three
new justices joined Exum in his majority opinion in Rutledge. It is possible that Exum did not
expressly overrule Morrison in order to retain the majority needed to defeat apportionment.
72. A. LARsON, supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-436 n.87 (Supp. 1983).
73. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
74. Morrison, 304 N.C. at 7 n.2, 282 S.E.2d at 464 n.2 (Finding of Fact 6).
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ment because they had contributed to her disability without having been
caused, aggravated, or accelerated by her employment.75 The Morrison dis-
senters, in an opinion written by Justice Exum, argued that plaintiff's phlebitis
was not an independent contributing factor and should not be apportioned
out. They maintained that the phlebitis could not have contributed indepen-
dently to plaintiffs disability because that disease alone had never kept her
from working,76 and asserted that Morrison's lung disease was entirely respon-
sible for her disability.
7 7
The Rutledge majority opinion, also written by Exum, did not adopt ex-
pressly the MAorrison dissent's description of independent contributing factors,
but did employ implicitly the same standard. By construing the Industrial
Commission's findings to mean that Rutledge's disability was due "entirely" to
her pulmonary disease,78 and by excluding plaintiff's significant nonpulmo-
nary factors from the scope of the Commission's consideration of the case on
remand,79 the Rutledge majority in effect used the independent contribution
standard described in the Morrison dissent, and ignored the standard appear-
ing in the Morrison majority opinion.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly adopts the Morrison dis-
senters' independent contribution standard in some future case, that decision
will have far-reaching consequences. The new standard may be expected to
shift the burden of proof to the employer, forcing him to prove independent
causation (actual loss of work due to the independent source) rather than
merely contribution.80 Strict adherence to the independent contribution stan-
dard would restrict severely apportionment of benefits due to nonoccupational
ailments, and might prevent apportionment altogether in multiple pulmonary
disease cases 81 even if a scientifically accurate test were developed that could
differentiate occupational and nonoccupational lung diseases. 8
2
An interesting question is raised when one considers whether, after Rut-
ledge, apportionment still is required when the Industrial Commission de-
clares a plaintiffs occupational disese to be byssinosis rather than chronic
obstructive lung disease. Because Rutledge did not overrule Morrison and
Hansel, one must assume that other components of chronic obstructive lung
disease, such as chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema, nonoccupa-
tional in their origin, would be apportioned out as separate diseases unless
75. Id. at 5, 282 S.E.2d at 462. There is some ambiguity about whether the court actually
factored out the non-lung-related causes. See id. at 21-22, 282 S.E.2d at 471-73 (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470 (Exum, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 19, 282 S.E.2d at 470-71 (Exum, J., dissenting).
78. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374. The Commission did not use the word
"entirely," but simply stated that plaintiff was disabled "because of her pulmonary impairment."
Record on Appeal at 3.
79. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 108-09, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
80. See id at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
81. ThefRutledge majority opinion suggests that apportionment is permissible only when the
independent contributing factors are nonpulmonary diseases. Id at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 374.
82. See, e.g., A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.64(b), at 7-430 (Dr. Selikoff's 1972 medical
breakthrough enabled doctors to distinguish between cancer and asbestosis).
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they had been aggravated or accelerated by the plaintiffs occupational expo-
sure. Rather than affirming that the Industrial Commission could have found
that chronic obstructive lung disease was occupational, as it did in Rutledge,
the court, to prevent apportionment in such a case, would have to rule that the
Commission must find chronic obstructive lung disease to be the occupational
disease and byssinosis merely one of its components, rather than a separate
disease. Such a decision would mandate that much of Morrison and Hansel be
overruled explicitly.
The court already may be headed in that direction. In Dowdy v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc.,83 handed down after Rutledge, the court determined that for stat-
ute of limitations purposes, plaintiff had been disabled by an occupational dis-
ease (chronic obstructive lung disease) in 1973,84 although he was not
informed of his occupational disease (byssinosis) until 1974.85 In rejecting
plaintiffs argument that he had been informed of a different occupational dis-
ease than he had contracted, which prevented the start of the statute of limita-
tions period, the court said:
[W]e think it unimportant here to determine whether byssinosis is a
particular type of chronic obstructive lung disease or a separate dis-
ease often found in conjunction with or evolving from chronic ob-
structive lung disease. For purposes of awarding workers'
compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between
chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis. .... 86
The Dowdy dicta seems to retreat from the sharp distinction between the two
diseases that enabled Rutledge's majority to reject apportionment without ex-
pressly overruling Morrison. The language provides future courts with a basis
for reading chronic obstructive lung disease into a future commission finding
of byssinosis in order to prevent apportionment.
8 7
Rutledge appears to return North Carolina to the nonapportionment rule
espoused in pre-Morrison North Carolina decisions s and in the majority of
83. 308 N.C. 701, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
84. Id. at 708, 304 S.E.2d at 220. The court stated that Dowdy's occupational disease was
chronic obstructive lung disease, despite the fact that big claim was filed for byssinosis and the
Industrial Commission had referred to his occupational disease as byssinosis. Dowdy v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc., 59 N.C. App. 696, 697, 298 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1982), rev'don other grounds, 308 N.C. 701,
304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
85. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 711-12, 304 S.E.2d at 221. In a separate concurring opinion, the
Rutledge dissenters argued that it was unnecessary for the Dowdy majority to decide that chronic
obstructive lung disease, diagnosed in 1973, was the plaintiffs occupational disease. Because
Dowdy was informed of his byssinosis in 1974, and because the statute of limitations would have
barred a cause of action arising in 1973 or 1974, there was "absolutely no reason to select the date
of 1973 except to fortify the language of Rutledge . Id. at 717, 304 S.E.2d at 224 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
86. Id. at 712, 304 S.E.2d at 222.
87. It was unnecessary for Dowdy to explicitly overrule Morrison. Because Dowdy's claim
was barred, no apportionment was possible.
88. See, e.g., Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978)
(no apportionment when industrial accident combines with nonoccupational infirmities, such as
age and education, to cause disability); Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253,
189 S.E.2d 804 (1972) (no apportionment when the 40% disability caused by silicosis combined
with nonoccupational factors to cause total disability); Self v. Starr-Davis Co., 13 N.C. App. 694,
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other jurisdictions.8 9 Generally, compensation is not determined by examin-
ing the relative contributions of multiple lung diseases "except in states having
special statutes on aggravation of disease."90 The controversy surrounding
Rutledge led to an attempt to enact just such a special statute in North Caro-
lina. Claiming that economic hardship would result from the Rutledge deci-
sion,9 1 textile manufacturers sought legislative relief.92 A bill was introduced
in the senate and sent to committee,93 where hearings were held but no action
was taken.
94
Rutledge's rule requiring full compensation whenever a plaintiff's em-
ployment has contributed significantly to his occupational disease is a fairer
approach to workers' compensation than Morrison's apportionment rule. The
difficulties in administering a rule of legal liability based on a scientifically
inaccurate standard of apportionment, together with the compromises inher-
ent in the workers' compensation system, would seem to call for a rule of lib-
eral construction of the occupational disease statutes. 95 Rutledge's rule of full
187 S.E.2d 466 (1971) (no apportionment when asbestosis accelerates and contributes to death by
brain tumor). See generally Note, (459o o]) My Breath, supra note 13, at 115 (prior to Morrison,
North Carolina appellate courts consistently rejected apportionment unless the apportionment
statute specifically applied).
89. See Note, (45%o o/) My Breath,supra note 13, at 122-24. North Carolina may be the only
state to judicially apportion pathology. See Ellis, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of Charles E.
Hassell, attorney for plaintiff inMorrison). The concept of apportionment was expressly rejected
in the landmark case of Pullman Kellog v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 450,
605 P.2d 422, 161 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1980). See also Rudedge, 308 N.C. at 104, 301 S.E.2d at 371
(citing cases from other jurisdictions rejecting apportionment).
90. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 59.22, at 10-365. See also Note, (45%0 o/) My Breath, supra
note 13, at 123-24 (North Carolina legislature's failure to amend the Workers' Compensation Act
to provide for apportionment in occupational disease cases after the Mabe decision indicates that
the legislature intended to prevent apportionment).
91. See Raleigh News and Observer, May 8, 1983, at 8A, col. 4. (executive director of N.C.
Textile Mfrs. Ass'n. estimates Rutledge decision could cost industry up to $200 million). These
costs are now being borne by the textile workers or by another compensation system. See, e.g.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP., October 15, 1981, at 388 (study showing that 95% of
byssinotics receive Social Security payments; only 5% receive workers' compensation awards).
As an alternative to seeking legislative relief from the Rutledge holding, textile manufacturers
could minimize the financial impact of Rutledge by refusing to hire smokers. See A. LARSON,
supra note 3, § 41.64(c), at 7-432 n.83.1 (employment discrimination against smokers is legal and
has been implemented by Johns-Manville). Adoption of such a policy now, however, would not
reduce their retroactive liability. Long-term liability also will be reduced by recently enacted
strict OSHA standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1982); see also 4A R. GRAY, A-roRiNEY's
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 205E-6 (3d ed. 1983). Nonetheless, their enactment without regard to
cost-benefit analysis-upheld in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)-
no doubt will increase the employers' costs in the short run.
92. Retired North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Huskins, author of the Morrison and Mal-
ston opinions, was hired to draft a bill to nullify Rutledge and mandate apportionment. Raleigh
News and Observer, May 5, 1983, at IA, col. 4. Huskins' bill received local press attention and
prompted a crowd of byssinosis victims to demonstrate their opposition by marching inside the
state legislature building, forcing the legislators to take a personal look at the victims' extensive
disabilities. Id., May 19, 1983, at IC, cols. 2-3.
93. See N.C. Sen. Bill 471 (1983). The bill as introduced did not achieve its stated purpose.
The occupational disease provision merely reiterated the language of Morrison, enabling it to
again be circumvented by naming chronic obstructive lung disease as the occupational disease.
Moreover, the bill went beyondRutledge, extending the doctrine to nontextile workers and requir-
ing apportionment of industrial accident cases as well. Id.
94. Raleigh News and Observer, May 19, 1983, at IC, col. 3.
95. See Edes, Compensationfor Occupational Diseases, 31 (10) LAB. L.J. 595, 599 (1980);
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compensation obtained through such liberal construction does not threaten to
turn the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act into "general accident
and health insurance," as the dissenters feared, for it is tempered by the re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove that his employment exposure signiftcantly
contributed to his disability. That Justice Exum concurred in the Walston de-
cision denying plaintiffs occupational disease claim implies that not every
case will meet this significant contribution test, making Rutledge truly a
"balance."
96
Although Rutledge seems to return North Carolina to the majority and
better view of occupational disease compensation, the court's hesitancy to ex-
pressly overrule Morrison leaves the law in a state of confusion at a time when
clarity is sorely needed.97 At its earliest opportunity, the court should clarify
the distinction, if any, between byssinosis and chronic obstructive lung disease
for apportionment purposes, admitting the court's significant legal and philo-
sophical differences with Morrison and Hansel.98
GREGORY STUART SMITH
Note, supra note 48, at 925 (occupationally diseased workers do not receive equitable trade-off
when they relinquish right to sue employers).
96. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 105, 301 S.E.2d at 371. A Commission finding of probable employ-
ment contribution should lead to full recovery, while one of merely "possible" contribution would
preclude any recovery.
See Swink v. Cone Mills, Inc., - N.C. App. -, 309 S.E.2d 271 (1983) (reversing on rehearing
the pre-Rutledge decision in Swink v. Cone Mills, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 475, 300 S.E.2d 848 (1983)).
The earlier Swink case had upheld an Industrial Commission denial of benefits to a worker who
had been exposed to cotton dust for 38 years but who also had a history of smoking and tuberculo-
sis. The court of appeals in the second case remanded the case to the Commission on the question
of causation, correctly noting that a "mere possibility" of industrial aggravation, held insufficient
to support plaintiffs claim in Walston, would not meet the Rutledge "significant contribution"
test. Id. at -, 309 S.E.2d at 272.
97. The number of byssinosis-type claims has mushroomed in recent years. See Ellis, supra
note 2, at 18 (913 filed in N.C. in 1970s, 684 in 1980 alone; up to 50% of these claims disputed).
98. Sufficient justification exists for overruling Morrison outright. As noted by the commen-
tators, Morrison was a "strained and self-serving interpretation of precedent," Note, Apportion-
ment,supra note 13, at 820, and could be overruled as an aberration in order to "reestablish North
Carolina's progressive tradition in the field of workers' compensation law," Note, (45% o]) my
Breath,supra note 13, at 125. Perhaps more palatable would be to overrule Morrison on the basis
of medical experts' refusals to assign percentages to the relative contributions of chronic lung
diseases. These practical difficulties, the extent of which perhaps was not recognized fully by the
Morrison court, could constitute changed circumstances--even since 198 1-justifying Morrison's
demise.
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